Privatization in Israel: The Creation of a Mature Market Economy by GURKOV, I. (Igor)
PRIVATIZATION IN ISRAEL 
The Creation of a Mature Market Economy* 
bY 
Igor GURKOV 
Foundation for Economic Research, Erasmus University, Rotterdam 
Higher School of Economics, Moscow 
Introduction 
Privatization has become a central feature of the economic poli- 
cies of a variety of nations. We can distinguish here various types of 
reduction of government influence: selling of state assets or whole 
state-owned firms, liberalization of former spheres of government 
activity, promotion of competition in national economy. It is not 
surprising that such a pervasive global process has  given rise to an 
enormous stream of scientific literature’. A significant part of the 
investigations has been devoted to the evaluation of privatization 
experiences in single countries or in groups of countries2. 
* The research for this paper has been sponsored by the Shapiro Fund of 
the Israeli Ministry of Absorption. The author is very appreciative of the 
support, advice and encouragement of Shlomo Maital. In addition, the author 
would like to thank Avner Ben-Ner, Solomon Cohen, Maartin de Zeeuw and 
an anonimous referee for helpful comments on an  earlier draft. Any remain- 
ing errors are his own responsibility. 
1 For a survey of the literature on privatization see Gurkov (1992). 
2 For an overview of the politics of industrial privatization in Western 
Europe see Vickers and Wright (1988), for a survey of the privatization 
experience of less developed countries, see Vernon (1988), and World Bank 
(1992). For a synthesis of cases of economies in transition see Keren and Ofer 
(1992) and Bos (1993). 
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However, one of the most interesting cases of privatization policy 
has not received significant attention in the scientific literature the 
experience of Israel in undertaking privatization. As the geographical 
location of Israel is on the cross-road between Europe, Africa and 
Asia, ite economic structure combines institutions of developed mar- 
ket economies, the distinctive characteristics of a Mediterranean 
country and some features shared with economies in transition. Such 
characteristics have not only resulted in a unique structure of the 
public sector in Israel, but have also led to the establishment of a 
peculiar privatization policy. Many elements of this policy could work 
well for other Mediterranean countries as well as for economies in 
transition. 
The aim of the paper is to present a review of privatization policy 
in Israel over the past decade. Emphasis will be placed on translating 
political attitudes and macroeconomic goals into organizational 
measures.The paper is comprised of five sections. In the first section 
we elucidate the position and the role of the public sector in the Israeli 
economy. In the second, we evaluate the origins of privatization policy 
in Israel and the different approaches to .privatization in meeting the 
objectives of economic liberalization and efficiency. We then survey in 
the third section managerial responses to government privatization 
measures and changes in the organizational behavior of privatized 
enterprises. The section also includes a brief overview of employee 
participation in Israeli privatization. Current privatization plans are 
briefly summarized in the fourth section, and conclusions and impli- 
cations are drawn in the fifth. 
1 Structure and Role of the Public Sector 
1.1 Some unique institutions 
The situation of Israel is in many ways unique. No other country 
has absorbed so many immigrants relative to its size. Few other 
countries have been able to modernize so extensively despite the 
active hostility of many of its neighbors and enormous military, 
political, and social commitments. These circumstances have leR 
their imprint on the Israeli economic structure. The Israeli economy 
differs from other developed market economies in the great share of 
the public sector in GDP and in the large degree of government 
intervention in economic activities. A phenomenon peculiar to Israel 
is that the public sector includes not only the government sector, but 
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1.2 The government sector 
The government sector in Israel includes those units which are 
an integral part of the government - the government ministries and 
the ancillary units of the different ministries, such as the Govern- 
ment Printing Mice and the Israel Military Industries. I t  also in- 
cludes several economic and non-profit statutory authorities that 
were established by a special law. Examples are the Bank of Israel or 
the Port and Railroad Authority. Finally, the government sector also 
includes some 160 state-owned enterprises. These enterprises are 
legally defined as corporations whose voting shares are owned by 
government bodies or by the State. 
The state-owned enterprises occupy monopolistic or dominant 
positions in electricity generation, oil production, communications 
and transportation, non-metallic materials and chemical and military 
industries. 
Table 1 - State-Owned Companb.: 
Net Worth, Revenue and Share of State Ownership 
Non-Metalic Minerals, 
Chemical and OH FVoducts 
Water and OecWity 
Transportation and 
Cornrnmications 
Machinery and Electrical 
and Dectronlc Equipment 
Transport €qupment 
Construction and Housing 
Other 
Notworth 
1990 NISI 
(Mlllh 
2,477.3 
4,700.1 
2.050.9 
764.7 
620.3 
169.1 
1,163.4 
* NISI .&$I 
Source: State of btad (1991), Central Btreau of StsUetiw (1902). 
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In 1993 the six biggest state-owned companies -Israel Electrical 
Corp., Israel Aircraft Industries, Bezek (the Israel Telecommunica- 
tion Corporation), Israel Chemical Ltd., Batei Zikuk (refineries) and 
El-AI (national airline) - ranked among the 10 largest Israeli compa- 
nies. In 1991 the state-owned companies in the 100 largest Israeli 
industrial companies accounted for 35.3% of their sales. Among the 
100 largest non-industrial companies, the state-owned enterprises 
accounted for some 47.6% of saless. On the whole, only 4.9% of 
employed persons in the Israeli economy worked in state-owned com- 
panies in 1990, but these firms made 14.6% of the total investments, 
and produced 16.9% of the national export and 18.6% of the Gross 
Domestic Product (State of Israel, 1991, p.3). 
This enormous extent of state ownership necessitated the crea- 
tion of an  intricate, multilevel system of management, regulation and 
control over state enterprises. This system includes a special govern- 
ment body responsible for corporate governance - the Government 
Companies Authority - and branch ministries. From 1986 each state- 
owned company has been under the control of two "responsible minis- 
tersn - the Minister of Finance (through t h e  Government Companies 
Authority) and another minister according to the enterprise's sector 
of activity (Minister of Defence, Minister of Communications, Minis- 
ter of Energy etc.). The government itself also includes several com- 
mittees that determine goals and policies of the state sector. In 
addition, there are numerous control bodies - the State Controller, 
who concentrates mainly on the financial discipline of state enter- 
prises, and the financial and control committees of the Knesset (Is- 
raeli Parliament), that  have a crucial role in the approval of financial 
transactions. A special place in this system is occupied by the Bank of 
Israel. The Bank Governor, by Israeli Law, serves as a Senior Eco- 
nomic Adviser to the Government, in all areas of macroeconomic 
policy. In this way the Bank can influences strategic aspects of public 
sector development. Studies of the comparative influence of different 
government bodies reported that the controlling minister had the 
strongest influence on companies' goals and policies, followed by the 
Government Companies Authority, the Government itself, the State 
Controller, and, finally, the Knesset with its committees (Aharoni, 
1984,9, p. 19). 
3 
the government and partially by private investors. 
Excluding Zim Ltd., the national shiping company, partially owned by 
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1.3 The Jewish Agency and other National Institutions 
Another group of organizations is very close to the government 
sector, but constitutes an  independent system. These are the Jewish 
Agency and other National Institutions. The Jewish Agency was 
founded in 1929 to help create of the future state. Even before this 
agency was formed, other so-called National Institutions were estab- 
lished. The two most important ones were the Keren Kayemet, 
mainly for the acquisition of land, and Keren Hayesod, for the crea- 
tion of the country's infrastructure. 
After the creation of the state in 1948, the proto-government 
organizations could have been dismantled, but were not. Today, the 
Jewish Agency owns many important economic institutions. First and 
foremost, the agency owns the majority of the voting rights in one of 
the largest Israeli banks, Bank Leumi. In 1990 this bank had accu- 
mulated some 34% of the total assets of the Israel banking sector. In 
1992 Bank Leumi was the largest Israeli bank in equity and second in 
net profit. The Bank Leumi group controls a large number of subsidi- 
aries and affiliated companies -banks, financial, insurance and real 
estate companies - and is also a partner in several large industrial 
companies. The Jewish Agency also held 33% of rights in Mekorot - 
the National Water Authority. In addition, i t  is the major means of 
channelling and allocating private financial aid to Israeli organiza- 
tions. Because of this, the position of the Jewish Agency is of the 
utmost importance. 
1.4 The cooperative sector 
The Histadrut sector is a unique Israeli creation. The Histadrut 
- the General Federation of Labor - was established in 1920. The 
Histadrut is not just a trade union,but also an organization caring for 
health, mutual aid, old age care as well as many economic activities 
(Barkai, 1989a; Barkai 1989b). 
The Histadrut controls several large holding companies, such as 
Koor Industries, the Israeli leader in net profits in 1992; Bank 
Hapoalim, the largest Israeli bank; Solel Boneh, the largest construc- 
tion firm in Israel; Shikun Ovdim, housing; insurance; as well as 
trading firms: Tnuva, the largest Israeli non-industrial firm; and 
Hamashbir, the major importer. Two transport cooperatives monopo- 
lize all bus transportation. In addition to these units (known as the 
"institutional economy") the Histadrut also has veto power in all 
kibbutzim and moshavim - the communal settlements - and in many 
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cooperatives in manufacturing, transportation and retailing (the 
“owned economy”) (Aharoni, 1991, p. 173). In 1989 the share of Hevrat 
Ha’Ovdim - the economic establishment of Histadrut - was 25% in 
manufacturing output, 38% in banking services and 18% in insur- 
ance. The cooperative sector also generated 74% of output in agricul- 
ture, 8% in construction, and 90% in bus transport. The total number 
of employees in the cooperative sector in 1989 was about 160,000 - 2.1 
times more than in the government sector - which amounts to 11.0% 
of total employment (Dun and Bradstreet, 1991). The Histadrut also 
has partial control of other firms in the economy, most important the 
holding company Clal, partially owned by Bank Hapoalim. 
It  should be remarked that this extent of cooperativeness is 
unique not only by comparison with developed market economies, but 
also with the former communist economies. Although in the 1980s, 
Rumania, Hungary and the Soviet Union surpassed the Israeli share 
of cooperative organizations in agriculture output, no Eastern Euro- 
pean country has reached a comparable degree of cooperative owner- 
ship in manufacturing. 
Many specialists set cooperative enterprises as a separate sector 
in the Israeli economy, but it seems appropriate to include it as a 
specific part of the public sector. Indeed, the number of members of 
the Histadrut - collective “owners” of funds and means of production 
- surpasses the total number of employed persons in Israel (respec- 
tively 1,600,000 and 1,461,000 in 19891, and practically all Israeli 
families indirectly participate in Histadrut activities‘. Moreover, in 
many cases it is almost impossible to separate the government and 
Histadrut sectors. This question is discussed more extensively below. 
1.5 Tangle of quasi-government organizations 
In Israel it is very difficult to demarkate boundaries of the public 
sector, as well as the boundaries of each kind of ownership within the 
public sector. A prominent Israeli political scientist, Ira Sharkanski, 
called this situation a “tangle of quasi-government organizations” 
(Sharkanski, 1987, p. 112). “he fundamental causes of this “interlac- 
ing“ are: 
4 
Holim, makes Histadrut membership mandatory. 
A major reason is that Israelis largest health insurance plan, Kupat 
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- the mutual partnership of several public institutions in a 
number of companies; 
the multilevel system of subsidiaries of the largest Israel holding 
companies; 
the conditionality of the formal definition of a “government com- 
the degree of government control of the economy. 
- 
- 
pany”; 
- 
The mutual partnership of the Histadrut, the Jewish Agency and the 
Government existed until recently in Zim, Mekorot and other compa- 
nies. Moreover, since 1983, the government held a substantial 
number of shares in the two largest Israeli banks - Hapoalim and 
Leumi, despite the fact that  they do not formally belong to the 
government sectol5. Such intra-penetration is especially appreciable 
at the level of subsidiaries and affiliated companies. Despite the 
modest size of the Israeli economy, there exist several developed 
holding groups with multilevel systems of subsidiaries and cross- 
participation. For example, Sonol Israel Ltd. is the second largest oil 
company in the country. It holds some 20% of the oil market and is 9th 
among the 100 largest Israel non-industrial companies. However, 
Sonol is only a subsidiary of Hevrat Ha’Ovdim, through Bank 
Hapoalim. As mentioned above, Bank Hapoalim in turn holds sub- 
stantial shares in the diversified concern, Clal. 
In addition, the very formal definition of government enterprises 
leads to  further erosion of the public sector boundaries. According to 
the Israeli Government Company Law of 1975, government compa- 
nies trace with an absolute majority (more than 50%) of government- 
owned shares. However, the government has numerous minority 
holdings in banks, industrial and trading companies. Such companies 
are excluded from the direct governance of the Government Compa- 
nies Authority and from the supervision of the State Controller, but 
they maintain informal relations with government bodies, which 
manifests itself in “soft budget constraints” and other protectionist 
measures. 
However, the principal cause of vagueness of public sector 
boundaries is the enormous degree of government control of economy 
and government involvement in the decisions of every single firm in 
5 
bought up most bank shares to stabilize the market. 
Following a collapse of stock market prices in 1983, the Government 
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the economy. The means of government intervention include the 
regulation of retail prices, determination of relative prices of the 
factors of production through cross-subsidies and by tariff bamers. 
These means are supplemented by the total state control of the 
capital market, because no private firm may issue bonds or shares 
without the approval of the Minister of Finance. The total control over 
land, water and electricity that are supplied to different users at 
different prices amplifies the picture of an  over-bureaucratized 
economy. If we recall the methods for promoting 'developing regions", 
and government preferences for lower interest rates and tax benefits, 
it  will be not surprising that, in the opinion of managers, the influence 
of the Finance minister and his ministry in the private sector is far 
greater not only than the influence of the Hevrat Ha'Ovdim Secre- 
tariat over cooperative enterprises, but also, with regard to opera- 
tional business decisions, and than the individual ministers' influ- 
ence over state-owned enterprises (Aharoni, 1984,5, p.41). 
Government enterprises and the other components of the public 
sector embrace a significant share of economic activities, and occupy 
monopolistic or dominant positions in key branches of industry and 
agriculture, transportation and communication, banking etc. The 
public sector as a whole constitutes no less than 40% of GDP - much 
more than in any Western economy. That is why the performance of 
the public sector is of crucial importance for national economic devel- 
opment. In this paper we will concentrate on manufacturing and basic 
services - the main areas of recent changes. 
2 The Politics of Israeli Privatization 
2.1 Background of the current privatization process 
Upntil the mid-l980s, the public sector was the engine of Israeli 
economic development. Within this sector were the military indus- 
tries, non-metallic mineral extraction, many branches of the chemical 
industry, and manufacturing. Studies on the comparative perform- 
ance of different sectors of the Israeli economy reported that in 1969- 
1981 Histadrut enterprises demonstrated greater efficiency than pri- 
vate enterprises (Ben-Ner and Estrin, 1988). A similar study on the 
relative performance of public and private sectors in Israel in 1982 
also suggested the greater efficiency of the public sector (Kondor, 
1991). Such superiority was based on massive capital subsidies and 
the implementation of capital-intensive technologies. Because of the 
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high level of inflation, the real interest rate was reduced to a negative 
figure (-2,5% in 1970-1972 and -16,6% in the period 1973-1978 (Ben- 
Porath, 1986, p.114). The public sector received also considerable 
resources from foreign economic aid. 
The start of a sharp stabilization policy in mid-1985 had a severe 
impact on the public sector performance. The attempt to stop the high 
inflation and to diminish the government debt led to a decrease in the 
volume of direct government support and put an end to the common 
practice of automatic government bailouts of bankrupt firms (Bruno 
and Meridor, 1991, p. 115). One measure of the stabilization program 
led to  high positive effective interest rates and forced the revision of 
many ambitious national programs. The most painful decision was 
taken at the end of 1987, to cancel the multi-billion dollar develop- 
ment of the Lavi aircraft project. This led to serious financial dificul- 
ties for all components of the public sector. In the the government 
sector rate of return of many firms was extremely low. The total 
return on capital of the government enterprises in 1987 was only 
1.1%; in 1988 i t  was 1.8%. It  rose to 6.6% in 1989 and fell again in 
1990 to 2.8% (State of Israel, 1991). A number of branches suffered 
from continuous considerable loss. Classification of government en- 
terprises according to their profitability and to the extent of competi- 
tion in their industries is shown in Figure 1 (see page 256). 
Only the oil, gas, transportation and telecommunication enter- 
prises are resonably profitable, owing to their monopolistic positions. 
According to the most common approach, the ideal strategy for dena- 
tionalizing the monopolistic, profitable enterprises in the lower-right 
quadrant is to deregulate the industry, allow competition, and ulti- 
mately sell the assets to  the newly-formed private enterprises. In 
contrast to profitable enterprises, the water and electricity suppliers 
in Israel lose money despite their monopoly status, because they are 
forced to  operate under price control. Without a significant change in 
their policy environment, there are unlikely candidates for privatiza- 
tion. Finally, unprofitable enterprises in competitive industries (the 
upper-left quadrant in Figure 1) could be denationalized in whole or 
in part by selling profitable segments or subsidiaries to private firms. 
The overview of the implementation of this strategic framework in 
the specific Israeli conditions constitutes the next step of our analysis. 
2.2 Short history of Israeli privatization programs 
Divestiture of state-owned enterprises is not an unknown eco- 
nomic policy in Israel. Between 1968 and 1972, the government 
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Figure 1. Claasification of situation of the stateowned enterprises. 
1. Transportation and Communications 5. Servicing for the Tourism Industry 
2. Oilandgas 6. Non Metali Minerals 
3. Miliarylndustry 7. Water and Electricity 
4. Housing and Construction 8. Research and Servising for Manufacturing and 
Commerce 
Source: Wemment Cornpaw Authorlly, Annual Report W30,1591 
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embarked on a privatization program: it sold 46 state-owned enter- 
prises, mostly small ones. 
After the elections of 1977 the new government also announced a 
major effort to sell state-owned enterprises, but sold very few. In 
March 1978 the Ministerial Economic Committee decided to diminish 
government participation in state enterprises by stock issues and by 
selling existing assets. This decision concerned 48 state companies 
that were chosen by 7 “teams”, from the controlling ministries. Each 
company had two supervisors: the Minister of Finance and a responsi- 
ble minister according to the main branch of its activities (Minister of 
Defence, Minister of Transport etc.). Despite these bureaucratic 
transformations between 1978 and 1986, there was no real selling of 
state enterprises, nor was any schedule or list of planned divestitures 
drawn up. A new wave of interest in privatization started after the 
success of the 1985 macroeconomic stabilization policy. Planned de- 
creases of the government budget deficit necessitated a search for 
non-traditional sources of revenue, and selling of state assets became 
one of them. 
At the beginning of 1986,the Ministry of Finance decided to 
initiate a staged privatization program. The government followed 
common practice for a privatization program: it did not rely on domes- 
tic specialists and invited as  a principal consultant the First Boston 
Corporation (FBC). The same approach was adopted one year earlier 
by the government of Turkey, when i t  invited the Morgan Guarantee 
Trust to  draw up a plan of massive privatization (see: Vernon, 1988). 
The Master Plan for Israeli privatization, presented by the FBC in 
April 1988, embraced 45 of the largest state-owned companies - 25 
state corporations with their subsidiaries - employing 85% of the 
state sector labor force. The recommendations of the Master Plan 
included: 
1) necessary pre-divestiture financial measures: clearing of bal- 
ance sheets; surety of outstanding debt; financial restructuring; 
2) change of legal status of government companies if necessary; 
3) transformation of regulation framework for state monopolies; 
4) preferable methods of privatization: 
- selling a proportion of the whole operation 
- selling the whole firm by public share issue 
- selling part of the shares to private buyers 
- stock issues and bond issues to employees 
rough schedules of divestiture actions. 5) 
Table 2 - Sy8twn Change, and Recommendations for Privatization of 
Stab-Owned Enterpd~io According to tho Fkot Boston Corporation (FBC) 
Agricultural Bmk 
Isreel chemicels Ud. 
- D k t  sale of state share (74%) 
- Dtectsale 
Isreel lnwstment Co. - Drect sale of5096 
for lndustrlel fw&pmnt 
Tahal 
Government Co. of - Drectsaleof50% 
CdnSandMedak 
Israel Co. far Farelgn 
Trade- lnsurence 
- Direct sele of51%, but not mmediw 
- Dlrect sale of 100% OT dkect sale d 51 % tnd 
subsequent salethe rest on the lacel stockmarket 
Karta - Directsaleofthewhole- 
PRIVATIZATION IN ISRAEL - CREATION OF A MATURE MARKET ECONOMY 259 
The proposed Master Plan did not escape the common fate of 
ambitious privatization programs, elaborated by foreign manage- 
ment consultants. Although the plan was well received, it did not take 
into consideration some legal technicalities, peculiarities of power 
distribution within the government and the public sector itself, and 
did not correspond to local accountants' practices and standards. For 
example, the FBC assessed the net worth of Israel Chemicals Ltd. 
(ICL) at $650-700 million, while an Israel consulting firm - Economic 
Models Ltd. - estimated the value of ICL in the range from $1.1 to 
$1.4 billion. A comparison was conducted between the Master Plan's 
clauses and real privatization actions in 1988-1992. None of the 
implemented divestiture decisions corresponded to initially proposed 
measures by First Boston. 
In the period February 1986 -July 1992 a significant change of 
control took place in five state-owned companies: Paz Ltd., Zion 
Cables, Jerusalem Economic Corporation, Maman, and Beit- 
Shemesh Engines. Other operations involved the partial privatiza- 
tion of bits and pieces of companies as well as the sale of corporate 
bonds on the stock market. Even the biggest operations - sales of 
Bezek's or ICES shares - did not make a major impact on government 
control of those companies. A large number of causes for the slow pace 
of privatization may be listed, but the main impediment to large-scale 
privatization was the attempt by each ministry to zealously guard 
those companies under its control, as a source of political power and 
patronage. 
After the Israeli parliamentary elections of 1992, the state enter- 
prises received particular attention from the new government. In the 
last week of June 1992 the Government Companies Authority re- 
ceived some 160 propositions from ministers for new appointments of 
directors of state enterprises. It has already been noted that two 
"responsible" ministers share the authority of appointing directors to 
the boards of the state companies, and therefore many positions are 
often left vacant for months at a time, due to disagreements between 
the ministers. 
However, the newly elected government's activity was not only 
confined to the selection of top officials. The goals of and approaches 
to privatization were also revised. The Minister of Finance formu- 
lated 6 principal objectives of privatization policy: 
- 'elimination of government responsibility for numerous business 
enterprises and promotion of competition in the national 
economy; 
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- 
- 
improvement of the efficiency of public monopolies' activities; 
attraction of foreign investors and integration of the Israel 
economy in the world economy; 
a significant decrease of the internal government debt by the 
sale of government assets; 
increasing flexibility of the labor market and participation of 
companies' employees in stock ownership; 
development and expansion of the local capital market. 
Simultaneous pursuit of those goals has  produced changes in 
methods of privatization. Because i t  seemed that the domestic capital 
market could not absorb a very considerable volume of the privatized 
companies' stock in a short time, selling a proportion of the whole 
operation by tender offer was placed the forefront of privatization 
efforts. At this was how the divestiture of Industrial Buildings Corp. 
was carried out. In the cases of Bezek and Israel Chemicals the 
proposed tenders were open to foreign companies operating within 
the same industries, i.e. to "strategic partners". 
Large-scale involvement of foreign capital in the Israeli privati- 
zation process has  a double rationale from the government's point of 
view. First, any strategic partner hopes to realize some additional 
benefits from acquisition of a state company : reinforcement of its 
position on the local market or even on the world market (in the case 
of Israel Chemicals); establishing vertical integration or organiza- 
tional combination with the acquired firm; receiving access to special 
resources like stable state orders, skilled workers, know-how, etc. 
According to these additional synergies, the value of a company for a 
strategic partner will be greater than for an outsider buyer, and hence 
the government attempts to appropriate this surplus. So, owing t o  the 
advantageous locations of the properties belonging to Industrial 
Buildings Corp., for instance, in the center of the country, 51% of its 
shares were sold for $201 million, whereas the value of the whole 
corporation for a n  outsider buyer had been estimated at only $330- 
340 million. 
Another explanation for the involment of foreign capital has a 
more strategic character. For many years the main forms of foreign 
capital transfer to Israel have been official US. military and civilian 
aid ($3.06 billion in year, $1.8 billion military and $1.2 economic) and 
support mobilized through various Zionist organizations. Today, the 
government is attempting to diminish, for political reasons, the de- 
gree of "ideology-inspired" economic support and is trying to  make 
- 
- 
- 
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Israel more attractive for private foreign investors. Moreover, “it is 
possible to bargain more aggressively with a foreign buyer than with 
a domestic buyer” (Jones and al., 1990, p. 188 1. 
The total gains from sale state assets from 1986 to the first half 
of 1993 totalled almost $2.1 billion. Public issues of stock and convert- 
ible bonds yielded some $159.3 million, private sales of stock and 
convertible bonds - $1,039.4 million, and public offers of stock and 
convertible bonds - $884.3 million. In addition, in the same period i t  
was issued $1,170.1 million in corporate bonds (State of Israel, 1993). 
2.3 Transformation of the Histadrut sector 
The stabilization program also had a severe impact on the 
Histadrut sector. The failure of Koor, the leading Histadrut industrial 
conglomerate, was the most drastic. In 1987, Koor incurred a loss of 
$240 million ($8,000 for each of its 30 thousand employees). The 
outstanding debt of the concern stood at $1.8 billion. In the fall of 
1988 Koor was blasted by crossfire fire from the New York-based 
Bankers Trust, one of Koor’s leading creditors. Bankers Trust filed in 
Tel Aviv courts for Koor’s liquidation. The threat from Bankers Trust 
was eventually neutralized, but the need for essential changes be- 
came obvious. The final transformation of Koor was accomplished in 
September 1991. The Koor debt-bailout pact between Hevrat 
Ha’Ovdim, the government and banks included the following provi- 
sions: 
Koor’s $600 million debt to Israeli banks was restructured 
through a write-off of $200 million. The remaining $400 million 
was spread over a nine-year period. The banks provided govern- 
ment-guaranteed index-linked loans of about $100 million at an  
interest rate of 5%. The principal would be repaid at a rate of 2% 
during the first seven years. An additional $30.5 million loan 
was used to pay holders of issued notes. After this exercise 
Israeli banks o w n  38.2% of Koor’s equity. Bank Hapoalim alone 
holds 25% of Koor’s stock. 
the $200 million debt to foreign banks was restructured to in- 
clude: 
- a write-off of 20% - about $40 million; 
- a payment in Koor’s ordinary shares - 17% or $35 million; 
- a cash payment of 423% of debt, $85 million. The remaining 
20% would be repaid in 8 biannual installments beginning 6 
years from the closing date. This debt bears interest of Libor 
plus 1%. 
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3) holders of Koor‘s $105 million notes in USA were repaid $24 
million and got 5.5% of Koor‘s equity. 
ARer this operation 25.9% of Koor‘s stock remained in the hands 
of Hevrat Ha’Ovdim and an additional 1096 in government hands in 
convertible bonds, linked to the Consumer Price Index with 4% real 
interest. 
The pact marked the nadir of Koor‘s financial troubles. From 
October, 1990 until November, 1992 the market value of Koor‘s stock 
rose by 1,10096 in nominal terms and by 819% in real terms, and the 
net worth of the concern reached $1 billion. In 1992 the operating 
profits of Koor rose by 61% and the net profit, by 45%. In assessing the 
result of the bailout operation of 1991, it  is possible to estimate the 
following financial gains. The government gained some $37 million 
from the growth of Koor’s stock value. The banks, which invested 
$200 million, received in one and a half years $245 million and the 
Hevrat Ha’Ovdim received the greatest gain: it put into the operation 
only $25 million and now owns $307 million. These impressive finan- 
cial results were obtained by a major restructuring and economy 
drive. Even Koor‘s headquarters were moved from a luxury building 
to more modest offices. The former conglomerate with 130 individual 
operating entities and a workforce of 31,000 employees was trans- 
formed into a holding company with 30 subsidiaries and affiliated 
companies, employing 18,000 employees. The main sources of finan- 
cial resource were not only internal retained earning and stringent 
economy, but also stock and bond offers and issues of the affiliated 
companies - Tadiran, Mahteshim and Shemen. Koor received about 
78% from $279 million gained through those operations. For example, 
Tadiran, a leading Israeli electronic company - camed out an initial 
public offering in June 1992 on the New York Stock Exchange. 
An additional source of resources for &of s transformation was 
the sale of Hevrat Ha’Ovdim shares in government companies. Up to 
1992, Hevrat Ha’Ovdim controlled 10% of Zim, 3.7% of El-AI, 2096 of 
War Hayarok and 33% of Mekorot voting rights. In March 1992 the 
government paid $10 million in exchange for Hevrat Ha’Ovdim’s 
shares in those companies. By this operation, the government at- 
tempted to put an end to the ”tangle of the public institutions” and to 
simplie the decision-making process concerning the divestiture of 
state enterprises. 
The experience of Koor may be applied to current ownership 
transformations in Eastern Europe. The industrial organization of 
those countries is characterized by the dominance of large monopolis- 
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tic and monopsonistic complexes. The current process of dissolution of 
such complexes is accompanied by the interruption of production ties 
and subsequent considerable economic damage. The new organiza- 
tion forms, developing now in the industry of Eastern European 
countries (associations, concerns), could use well the techniques ap- 
plied to  Koor’s restructuring as a model. 
3 Managerial Response to the Privatization 
The attitudes of Israeli managers towards privatization are very 
ambiguous. On the one hand, there is incontestable evidence that 
privatization signifies the elimination of political supervision and 
incompetent intervention in business decision-making, and hence 
managers welcome the general strategy of privatization. On the other 
hand, there is strong opposition of managers of state enterprises to  
new privatization plans. The situation aggravated so much, that  on 
22 February 1993 the Ministerial Committee on Privatization had to 
insert a special amendment into the Law of Government Corpora- 
tions, 1975, stating that now, the Ministerial Committee on Privati- 
zation can dismiss any top.executive of any state enterprise who 
resists divestiture decisions. We shall next examine both sides of the 
managerial attitudes, pros and cons. 
3.1 Positive shifts in post-privatization behavior 
The cumulative experience of post-divestiture enterprise per- 
formance allows identification of four essential positive shifts in man- 
agemen t: 
1) establishment of long-term targets; 
2) higher flexibility; 
3) closer connections with international companies and greater 
possibilities of production and market cooperation with foreign 
companies; 
4) development of new patterns of motivation. 
First a t  all, managers in privatized companies received a com- 
plete set of well-defined operational goals. The establishment of clear 
operational goals has been a weak point of strategic management in 
state-owned enterprises. We already mentioned the new wave of 
managerial appointments in privatized enterprises after the parlia- 
mentary elections of 1992. Similar events shake up the Israeli govern- 
ment sector after every political disturbance or ministerial crisis. 
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When this takes place, personal score-setting with members of the 
political hierarchy takes first place among the factors influencing 
managerial appointments. Its average score of influence, according to 
the opinion of the managers of government business enterprises was 
5.30 (in 7-point scale), while the influence of the %uccess in previous 
job” was assessed only as a 4.90 (Aharoni, 1984, J-1). The insecurity of 
the top managers about their positions has  prevented the implemen- 
tation of long-term targets and plans. 
The new possibilities for greater flexibility are based on produc- 
tion diversification and establishment of new sectors of business and 
new potential, latent in renewed managerial techniques. For exam- 
ple, after the transfer of the oil company Paz from government to 
private hands, the new owners - the Liberman family - introduced an 
up-dated computerized management system, according to the world 
standards in the oil industry (Ministry of Defence, 1991). Such flex- 
ibility allows more effective operation in competitive overseas mar- 
kets. An example of the reorientation of a privatized company is the 
recent experience of Maman Ltd. This company was among the first 
completely privatized state companies. Although the price for i ts  core 
business - the monopoly concession for handling air cargo - is still 
government controlled, the company adopted a new strategy of diver- 
sification. As a result of the establishment of the new lines of busi- 
ness, net profit rose by 80% in comparison to the pre-divestiture 
period, while the labor force has increased by 36%. A11 the additional 
profit came from 30% revenues that stemmed from the new activities 
- handling passenger cargos and managing warehouses. Maman 
became a n  active partner in several joint ventures in Israel and 
abroad. It established a partnership with another transport company 
and has also invested $5 million in the Israel Marketing Center in 
Amsterdam. 
Finally, privatization allows the implementation of many new 
tools and methods for motivating both managers and employees. A 
most attractive method is the distribution of shares among the em- 
ployees. The first Israeli divestiture agreements did not include any 
advantages for the employees or managers of privatized enterprises. 
For example, the demands of the employees of Paz Ltd. for 
acquisition of shares were rejected as unnecessary and absurd. The 
first attempt to involve the employees in the privatization process 
was made in July 1991 in the public issue of shares of Dead Sea 
Periclase Ltd. The employees received 3.4% of the ordinary shares 
and options at a special price - 1/7 of the price which the general 
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public paid. Then, in the February 1992 issue of Israel Chemicals 
shares, ICL employees were offered 15,5 million shares at a reduced 
price of 8.61 per share in comparison to $1.0 per share to other buyers. 
The employees' portion totals 4.7% of the issue, and about 1% of total 
company stock. Finally, in the recent Bank Hapoalim offering a 
separate offering to the banks' employees was added. The employees 
received 10% of the shares on offer. 
Moderate participation of employees in property gives additional 
benefits to the managers of privatized companies. On the one hand, 
selling shares with considerable advantages for the firm's own em- 
ployees and other public sector employees could render the public 
reaction to the "golden parachutes" of managers more gentle. Today, 
the egalitarian traditions of the Israeli society reveal themselves in 
very painful responses to the visible inequalities of the wealth distri- 
bution. The attempts of top managers to receive considerable pack- 
ages of shares of privatized companies provoke enormous interest and 
an extensive wave of negative publicity. The sharing of benefits 
among a greater number of participants should make privatization 
more acceptable to the public opinion. 
On the other hand, a s&pikcant advantage for the managers is 
related to the post-divestiture control allocation. The position of a 
"mixed enterprise" where the government will not be able to interfere 
in company affairs in an arbitrary manner, and where there will not 
be significant pressure from minority shareholders, embodies the 
dream of public sector managers (see: Ben-Shahar, 1991, p. 99). 
Therefore, the managers prefer the "soft" variant of privatization by 
minority stock issues (up to 25% of voting rights). Employees' partici- 
pation plans can provide the massive socio-political pressure on the 
government to choose the appropriate variant of divestiture. 
3.2 Inconvenience factors. 
At the same time, many government privatization actions meet 
with strong opposition from managers of enterprises to be privatized. 
Maximal resistance is provoked by tender offers of a controlling 
interest in government companies and especially by the planned 
participation of foreign "strategic partners" in the privatization proc- 
ess. 
The sale of part of a state-owned company through tender offer 
under the aegis of government bodies has created an unusual situa- 
tion for managers. For the first time Israeli managers encountered 
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the threat of involuntary acquisition or hostile merger of their compa- 
nies. Usually they have been protected from that by several unique 
features of Israel's stock market. 
The single most important feature of Israeli firms is their 
uniquely concentrated control structure. In the great mqjority of 
firms control is held by a single stockholder or a number of stockhold- 
ers acting in concert. As a result, any attempted acquisition must be 
negotiated with, and accepted by, the target firm's incumbent man- 
agement, which is controlled, in turn, by a single coalition of owners. 
Another unique future of the Israeli capital market is 'pyramiding". 
Corporate clusters emanating from a single holding company and 
filtering down to a large number of subsidiaries are quite common 
everywhere. However, the Israeli capital market is unique in its 
tolerance of simultaneous public offerings made by several issuers 
belonging to the same cluster (Procaccia, 1989, p.5). Both these fea- 
tures imply that hostile acquisitions are virtually impossible. There- 
fore, not only the managers ofpublic enterprises, but also the manag- 
ers of private enterprises lack experience in defending their compa- 
nies against such takeovers. 
A short Israeli privatization history includes several examples of 
takeovers of state companies. Such was the case of the sale of Paz Ltd. 
in July 1988, when its Director General, Arie Levy, learned only from 
a morning newspaper to whom the company had been sold. Another 
example of a takeover is the case of Beit Shemesh Engines Ltd., 
where, in March 1992, the government implemented a recovery plan 
and transferred the right to manage the company for a two-year 
period to its strategic partner - Ormat Turbines Ltd. - with the right 
to purchase the government's share (60%) in the company during this 
period. The last example of a takeover is the sale of 51% of shares in 
Industrial Buildings Corp. in spite of the strong opposition of its top 
managers. In 1992, Bezek and Israel Chemicals Ltd. were in a similar 
situation, and their top executives were resisting, by various means. 
I t  is obvious that any divestiture has several immediate negative 
psychological effects for the acquired company's managers and work- 
ers. Indeed, an incorporation into another company changes habits 
and roles completely and alters established areas of power within the 
organization, transfers the centers of decision-making, and disturbs 
intra-firm and external communications. As a rule, any takeover 
transforms the existing formal and informal promotion schemes, and 
causes deterioration of promotion prospects for managers of an ac- 
quired company. 
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Skilled and unskilled employees also experience inconveniences 
from takeovers. First, post-merger organizational transformation and 
production rationalization may cause massive redundancies or intra- 
firm re-arrangements and dismissals. Even if this does not occur, 
many problems arise, related to the safeguarding of established long- 
term social programs. 
Furthermore, all the above-mentioned problems become much 
more complicated in the case of international takeovers. The two 
major Israeli government companies, Bezek (telecommunications) 
and Israel Chemicals Ltd. are especially sensitive to the danger of 
horizontal merger, i.e. product and market extension, while the ac- 
quiring firm has relevant market and business expertise. A habitual 
strategy for the acquirer in a horizontal merger is "pillage and plun- 
der", where the acquiring organization "raids" a target firm and 
replaces all operations and strategic and cultural systems with its 
own. This gives rise to many new conflicts, due to the introduction of 
different managerial cultures. Although the widest economic, politi- 
cal and cultural contacts bind Israel and the Western World, Israel 
has its own original management culture derived from the fusion of 
the national traditions, habits and skills acquired during long obliga- 
tory military service, and the common lax style of Mediterranean 
countries. The integration of such a culture into another, especially 
the Anglo-Saxon tradition, is not easy (see Lawrence, 1990). 
The third main kind of managers' fear is related to the risk of 
giving up government backing and bankrolling, and accepting the 
much larger degree of personal responsibility for business. Notwith- 
standing the fact that in Israel many private and cooperative enter- 
prises receive considerable amounts of government aid (grants, direct 
transfers, cross-subsidies, guaranties of consolidated debts and 80 
on), state-owned companies have much more "friendly access" to the 
public coffers. 
So far, we clarified the main forces operating in the Israeli 
privatization process, and reviewed the reasons for opposition to the 
recent government plans. Now we proceed to examine the tactics of 
managerial resistance and to evaluate the means for improving priva- 
tization plans. 
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4 Correct ion of the Privatization Policy and Elaboration 
of the New Plans 
Let us analyze the defensive behavior of the two biggest Israeli 
state companies. Both have monopolistic positions on the local mar- 
kets and are proposed for further privatization: Bezek and Israel 
Chemicals LM. (ICL). The quasi-government company Bezek was 
established in 1980. In 1984 it received a monopoly for telecommuni- 
cations, but  under the new operating license that was signed in July 
1992 by the former Minister of Telecommunications hours before 
leaving ofice, Bezek will not be able to supply communications serv- 
ices or products other than infrastructure and basic services. Bezek 
occupies third place among Israeli state companies according to the 
number of employees. In 1991 Bezek employed 9358 people, its turno- 
ver reached $2,535 million and revenues $1,464 million. Bezek is also 
a monopsonist on the Israeli market for telecommunication equip- 
ment. For example, in 1992 Bezek accounted for 60% of the sales of 
Tadiran and 20% of the sales of Telerad -two major Israeli electron- 
ics producers. 
In 1990-1991 the government decreased its share in Bezek to 
76% by two stock issues, but some proposed steps, including an  
additional sale of 8% to an institutional investor, were deferred. In 
December 1992, the government announced i ts  schedule of privatiza- 
tion and liberalization in telecommunications. I t  proposed to break 
the existing monopoly for the cellular phones and overseas calls. One 
of the principal pre-conditions for the tenders is acceptance of govern- 
ment price control for the new operators’ activities. At the same time, 
the government, and especially the Prime-Minister and the Minister 
of Finance, plan to continue the privatization process and to transfer 
the controlling interest in companies to a “strategic partner”. 
Israel Chemicals Ltd. is in a similar situation. Its history goes 
back to 1930; the current company was established in 1967. ICL 
consists of the parent company (ICL itsel0 and 14 affiliated compa- 
nies involved in the mining of the Dead Sea, for which the company 
holds a concession until 1999. As a group, ICL provides jobs for some 
6,000 people, its revenues from sales and services totalled $897.8 
million in 1991, and its operating profits reached $68.9 million in the 
same period. In February 1992 19% of ICL’s equity was offered to the 
public. Some 226.6 million ordinary shares were issued, of which 
117.6 million were offered to institutional investors. The final pro- 
ceeds from this operation reached $235.2 million. The next planned 
step envisages a tender offer to  “strategic partners”. Even if it does 
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take place, the government intended to retain in its hands “the golden 
share”, which: would allow the government to veto a sale of the 
company to parties considered hostile to Israel; would prevent the 
transfer of the company’s headquarters outside Israel; would govern 
the use of strategic reserves controlled by ICL. 
In both cases the proposed divestiture methods displeased the 
top managers. However, the specific situation of an Israeli state 
company drastically reduces the range of available preventive ac- 
tions. On the one hand, the very complicated multi-stage system of 
control over Israeli state-owned enterprises, which includes the State 
Companies Authority, the Ministry of Finance, the ministers-supervi- 
sors, the Ministerial Committee on Privatization, the Financial Com- 
mittee of the Knesset, and some other controlling bodies does, not 
allow the use of anti-takeover provisions such as the upoison pill” (a 
clause in the corporate bylaws that provides a disadvantageous result 
for a potential acquirer should its ownership position be allowed to 
exceed some pre-assigned threshold). The state company lacks the 
right to include such provisions in its statutes. 
On the other hand, state cQntrol makes inefficient a “scorched 
earth defence” - a tactic in which the defending company’s manage- 
ment engages in practices that reduce their company’s value to such a 
degree that it is no longer attractive to the potential acquirer. For a 
state company, deplorable results of its business activities or continu- 
ing considerable losses may be additional arguments for deliverance 
from the state sector. In the most extreme case the government can 
transfer the rights to manage such a “permanently failing company” 
to a private firm in the same branch, at a minimum price. 
Finally, conditions in the Israeli capital market make impossible 
another advantageous form of anti-takeover defence: leveraged buy- 
out, i.e. a purchase of a company, financed largely by debt, that is 
backed by the firm’s own assets. Management leveraged buy-outs, 
when a primary debt-financed purchase of all the stock or assets of 
the company is done by an investor group composed of the firm’s 
managers, are widely prevalent in many countries. However, the real 
interest rate in Israel is too high for such operations to be feasible and 
profitable. 
Therefore, managers were forced to search for new methods and 
arguments. The first set of proposed arguments against the involve- 
ment of a foreign partner in the privatization process touched on 
national interests and security. In the case of Bezek there were the 
questions of the military communication system services, in the case 
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of ICL - the necessity of special environment protection and preven- 
tion of attractive tourist places on the Dead Sea. 
These questions focused much attention on the problems of post- 
divestiture regulation. One possible answer for the government re- 
sides in refinements of tender conditions and in a more selective 
choice of buyers. Another lies with the creation of a regulation frame- 
work for privatized companies. We have already mentioned the 
rights, given by the "golden share", to government bodies. Under the 
prevailing conditions of the Israeli economy, with the strong tradition 
of the state intervention, the problems of regulation cannot be the 
governing argument against privatization of state monopolies6. 
Another, very hopeful method of anti-takeover defense was the 
presentation of stock and bond issues as a unique means for financing 
large long-term investment programs. For example, the Board of 
Directors of Bezek has proposed a $3-billion 5-year development 
program for national telecommunications, including the laying of a 
480 km long optic-fiber cable "highway". Together with the announce- 
ment of this program the Managing Director of Bezek stated in his 
letter to the Minister of Finance, that  Bezek had already spent $600 
million of its annual development budget, and the development pro- 
gram for 1993, projected to be $630 million, would be cut by 12% 
unless the proposed stock and bond issues goes ahead. 
A third method was an artificial over-estimation of the advan- 
tages to state finance from constant government control. For exam- 
ple, in December 1992, Bezek declared i ts  expected dividend to be NIS 
40 million, stating that "when the Minister of Finance complained of a 
lack of money, Bezek gave the money to the country". The goal of such 
actions is the maximal possible overestimation of a company's eco- 
nomic value for government but subsequently, also for a potential 
acquirer. 
The following method, used by Bezek, can be compared to a 
"white knight defence" - finding an important ally to purchase a 
strong minority position (for example, 25%) of the potential acquisi- 
tion stock. Presumably this ally (the "white knight") will oppose and 
hopefully block the efforts of any hostile firm seeking to acquire the 
vulnerable firm. Indeed, great interest has been expressed by the 
biggest international telecommunications companies in purchasing a 
6 
see Arnon and Fershtman (1992). 
For the analysis of the privatization of the natural monopolies in Israel 
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controlling interest in Bezek - among them AT&T, Alcatel and 
Southwest Bell. The latter joined forces with the domestic Israel 
concern Clal and proposed to buy 25% of Bezek's stock immediately, 
and an additional 26% during the next two or three years. 
To counterbalance this plan, Koor proposed another program of 
divestiture, It was negotiating with First Boston, Memll Lynch and 
Bell Atlantic in an effort to forge a consortium of investors to purchase 
a controlling interest (25%) in Bezek. If this materializes, 50% of 
Bezek's shares would be sold on the Israeli stock market in addition to 
the 25% that was held by the public. In such a proposition Bell 
Atlantic - a company with $12 billion annual sales, and 65,000 
employees - would serve as a cloak for a vertical merger between 
Bezek and domestic manufacturers of communication equipment. 
Indeed, following the plan, foreign investors as a whole (including the 
proposed "strategic partner") would not be able to receive more than 
6% of Bezek's stock. The benefit for Bezek in such a proposal would be 
a merger with a friend firm, with a similar management culture and 
the specific traditions of the Histradrut sector. The principal interest 
of Koor in this merger was the preservation of long-term contracts for 
equipment deliveries for telecommunications. 
Finally, the most controversial and potentially dangerous 
method of anti-takeover defence, accepted by the management of 
Bezek, is the aggravation of labor conflict under the government 
privatization program. In November 1992, after the announcement of 
details of government plans for liberalization and privatization in 
telecommunication, a strike of 2,000 employees was provoked. The 
strike resulted in disturbances in communication services in the 
Northern District of Israel. During one working day there were no 
routine and preventive repairs, nor information services and overseas 
calls. The strike received much media attention that served to attract 
public interest to Bezek's problem. 
Simultaneously, manpower cuts were announced, for the first 
time in the existence of the company. In January 1993 the Directors of 
Bezek elaborated a program of early retirement on a pension for some 
500 employees. In addition, it planned to dismiss in the next three or 
four years another 1,500, Tf liberalization and privatization will be 
continued". The cost of dismissing employees from state enterprises is 
very high in Israel. The government has enormous commitments to 
employees of state companies.The discharge of 2,000 employees 
would cost $150 million, and the company intended that the govern- 
ment foot the bill. 
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After the implementation of these measures the strategic goal of 
the company’s managers was accomplished. The question of foreign 
participation in the divestiture became a political problem. The work- 
ers of Bezek demonstrated in front of government buildings with 
slogans against the sale to  a strategic partner. They met with mem- 
bers of the Knesset and received support for their demands. Today, 
Bezek looks forward to raising i ts  capital by stock issues and using 
proceeds from this operation for early repayment of the company’s 
debt to the Treasury. The consolidated debt of Bezek to the Israeli 
government is now up to $1.3 billion. Bezek is preparing a prospectus 
for the issuing of $260 million shares in the first phase of a $520 
million capital raising exercise. 
Other current privatization plans include the sale of 65% of the 
stock of Shekem -the large trading company which has the exclusive 
contract to operate army canteens; the Company for Quality of the 
Environment and several building companies (see Table 3). However, 
the main kind of operations for divestiture is now public offers and 
issues on the domestic stock market. The resistance of the managers 
to tender offers is mainly responsible for this shift of the privatization 
policy. Another cause of change of methods of industrial privatization 
was the success in privatization of banking assets. 
Rather than attempt to present a complete picture of the bank- 
ing reform in Israel, we outline only those features, related to the 
privatization policy’. The government of Israel is now the major 
shareholder in the four largest banking groups in the country (Bank 
Hapoalim, Bank Leumi Le Israel, Israel Discount Bank and the 
United Mizrahi Bank); nevertheless the regulated shares eventually 
held by the government have no voting rights, even though they 
constituted almost 100% of the bank’s equity. The assets of the four 
semi-nationalized banks account for about 91% of the total assets of 
commercial banks in Israel (Ruthenber, 1993). These banks are also 
major shareholders in non-banking corporations. 
The government started to sell the bank shares in 1991. First, i t  
sold its interest in I.D.B. Bankholdings back to the former owners - 
the Recanati family. Then the government attempted to sell the 
controlling interest in the Mizrahi Bank to a domestic financial mag- 
nate, but this deal did not receive approval from the Financial Com- 
7 
and Sadka (1992) 
For a general discussion about the banking structure in Israel see Razin 
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mittee of  the Knesset. All these transactions were in the form of 
private sales. 
The first public offering on the Tel-Aviv stock exchange of the 
government bank shares was in May 1993, when 21% of the Bank 
Hapoalim shares were sold. The enormous offering ($307.4 million) 
was over,scrubed a t  the maximum price. This demonstrated the matu- 
rity of the Israeli capital market and its preparedness for the large 
privatization transactions. Few days after this transaction the gov- 
ernment sold 60% shares of Bank I y d  (some $85.5) to four domestic 
institutional investors. Those events put an end to the attempts to 
involve hostile foreign firms in the privatization process. As a result, 
the subsequent privatization transactions reached an  unprecedented 
amount. .According to the last published data, in 1993 the government 
received $1.466 billion from the sales of state-owned companies and it 
foresees to receive about $1.0 billion in 1994. 
The list of further privatization events includes sale of control- 
ling interests in Bank Hapoalim and Bank Leumi (two major banks), 
Shikun U’Pituah (housing) and Tahal (water engineering); and inter- 
ests in israel Shipyards and Zim Shipping Lines, the Shekem 
comissary chain, Israel Chemicals and the Bezeq telecommunications 
company (Sandler, 1994). 
5 Conclusions 
We have surveyed very briefly the recent experience of Israeli 
privatization. Some conclusions need to be drawn. 
First of all, privatization in an over-regulated economy like that 
of Israel can be successful only with the maximal involvement of 
domestic resources and aproper adherence to domestic management 
traditions. Any foreign-inspired models of divestiture can only pro- 
duce negative reaction to the government measures, and finally they 
will be neutralized. This experience is especially important for the 
current privatization process in the economies of transition. Any 
condemnations of uspontaneousn and ubureaucraticn privatization 
cannot help to avoid the necessary steps of organizational restructur- 
ing. 
The second main conclusion, drawn from the Israeli privatiza- 
tion experience, is that  the long-standing traditions of government 
control over the national economy allow it  to resolve the problems of 
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post-divestiture regulation without the establishment of new special 
“regulatory homes”. The post-communist countries, and especially 
the independent states of the former Soviet Union, now suffer from a 
lack of “manageability” of the national economy. Careful analysis of 
the organizational framework of the Israeli public sector may be 
helpful for the development of government structures for the econo- 
mies in transition. 
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